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Secularism is frequently portrayed as a security referent in present-
day Turkey. But, what is it that makes secularism a security issue?
Where are we to locate the ‘securityness’ of secularism? Against pre-
vailing accounts that privilege the domestic dimension, this article
argues that the securityness of secularism in Turkey should be located
in both the domestic and the international. This is not to suggest that
secularism can be reduced to security, but it is to suggest that efforts
to portray Turkey’s secularism merely as a constitutive principle and
an outcome of the project of Republican transformation, or as a means
of safeguarding a particular vision of transformation through control-
ling religion, or as an instrument of national economic development,
while rewarding in themselves, nevertheless miss an important set of
dynamics that help to explain secularism’s centrality to Turkey’s
politics. The article locates this latter set of dynamics in the interna-
tional realm and ultimately proffers the argument that secularism was
in part a response to European/international society’s ambivalence
towards Turkey’s ‘difference’ and the insecurities this entailed. The
conclusion suggests that the present-day centrality of secularism in
Turkey’s politics and the apparent securityness of such centrality
could be considered as a response to particular remembrances of the
past and interpretations of the present vis-à-vis such ambivalence.
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IN PRESENT-DAY TURKEY, secularism is frequently portrayed as a secu-rity referent – something that is under threat and that needs safeguard-ing.1 Those who belong to the highest echelons of the state underwrite the
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1 Throughout this article, I use the term ‘secularism’ as opposed to the more appropriate ‘laicism’, while rec-
ognizing that Turkey’s interpretation and practices do not exactly fit either Anglo-Saxon models of secu-
larism or the French laïcité. Even though Turkey’s version of secularism was modelled after France (as
evinced in the use of the word laiklik), the experiences of the past 80 years have deviated from the French
ideal type (Asad, 2003; Hurd, 2004; Taylor, 1998). Although I agree with Davison (2003: 334) on the point
that Turkey’s self-understanding and practices are better captured with the concept of laicism than with
the concept of secularism’, I have nevertheless chosen to use ‘secularism’ in reference to Turkey’s laiklik
to avoid further complicating the narrative.
status of secularism as a key referent when they write irtica (obscurantist
reactionarism) into the national security agenda.2 But, what is it that makes
secularism a security issue? Where are we to locate the ‘securityness’
(Wæver, 1995b) of secularism?
Inquiring into the securityness of secularism is not meant to question
whether obscurantist reactionarism constitutes a threat to security in Turkey
or elsewhere. Rather, it rests upon the theoretical premise that ‘danger is not
an objective condition’ (Campbell, 1992: 1) but is socially constructed.
Understanding how the Soviet placement of missiles in Cuba in 1962
(Weldes, 1999; Weldes & Saco, 1996) and the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait in 1990
(Campbell, 1993) became dangers to US security, for instance, requires
examining what David Campbell (1992) has termed ‘discourses of danger’ –
the set of validity claims through which someone or something is repre-
sented as under threat and in need of safeguarding. Studying insecurity as a
social construct involves examining such representations ‘through which
individuals describe to themselves and to others the world in which they
live’ (Weldes et al., 1999: 14) and which constitute their insecurities, identities
and interests (McSweeney, 1999). Needless to say, taking threats as socially
constructed does not render them less ‘real’ – unless, that is, one claims
unmediated access to ‘reality’.
As such, understanding secularism’s present-day status as a key security
referent in Turkey involves paying close attention to the ‘discourses of
danger’ through which its securityness has been constructed. For, ‘the mean-
ing of a concept is in its usage’ (Wæver, 1995b: 226). This is not to deny that the
set of validity claims through which insecurities are produced is ‘subject to
redemption through argumentation’ (Wyn Jones, 1999: 111); nor is it to under-
play Ken Booth’s (2008: 165) misgivings about ‘discourse-centric’ approaches
to the study of security. Rather, the aim here is to underscore the insights to be
gleaned from inquiring into the securityness of a particular issue. 
As will be seen below, my analysis of Turkey’s case uncovers an intimate
historical relationship between secularism and security.3 This relationship
should not be viewed as restricted to helping safeguard secularism once it
was initiated (as the literature suggests), for its origins can be found in the
‘non-specific and non-military’ security concerns of the founding leaders
during the early years of the Republic – some of which remain in different
guises in present-day Turkey.4 The non-specific and non-military security
problem encountered by Turkey’s founding leaders was one of seeking a
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2 The other top agenda item is Kurdish separatism.
3 This is not to suggest that security was the only or the most important motive behind Turkey’s turn to sec-
ularism. The gains of secularism for Turkey’s society and institutions are numerous and need not be list-
ed here. Nor is it to reduce Turkey’s early Republican security policies to Westernization and/or secular-
ization.
4 For a preliminary analysis of Turkey’s security imaginary, see Bilgin (forthcoming).
way to negotiate difference given European/international society’s ambiva-
lence toward their ‘difference’. Religion at the time was considered the most
significant marker of this difference.5 The founding leaders seem to have
found a part of the solution in the turn to secularism. In pointing to such an
intimate relationship between secularism and security, I draw on accounts by
Ole Wæver (1995a, 1998) and Bill McSweeney of European integration as a
‘security policy in response to a non-specific and non-military security prob-
lem’ (McSweeney, 1999: 8), as well as Michael Williams’s (1998) analysis of
modernity’s ‘quest for certainty’ as a response to the ‘security concerns of the
early modern era’. Thus, the securityness of secularism becomes an issue to
be explored through locating the recourse by Turkey’s actors to ‘discourses of
danger’ in its social and historical context.
In what follows, I suggest that the securityness of secularism in Turkey
should be located in both the domestic and the international. While I seek to
contribute to the literature that discusses the centrality of secularism to
Turkey’s politics with reference to domestic concerns, I also seek to recast
these discussions by pointing to the international dimension. This is not to
suggest that secularism can be reduced to security, but it is to suggest that
efforts to portray Turkey’s secularism merely as a constitutive principle and
an outcome of the project of Republican transformation (the ‘separation’
account), or as a means of safeguarding a particular vision of transformation
through controlling religion (the ‘control’ account), or as an instrument of
national economic development (the ‘material advancement’ account), while
rewarding in themselves, nevertheless miss an important set of dynamics
that help to explain secularism’s centrality to Turkey’s politics both at the
moment of its initiation and in the present day. I locate this latter set of
dynamics in the realm of the international and ultimately proffer the argu-
ment that secularism was in part a response to international society’s ambivalence
towards Turkey’s ‘difference’ and the insecurities this entailed.6
The argument is built as follows: The first section looks at the aforemen-
tioned three accounts that prevail in the literature on Turkey’s politics. These
three accounts (and their variants) capture different (domestic) security
aspects of the centrality of secularism to Turkey. Their differences lie in what
they regard as the referent object and the nature of threats. My aim in this sec-
tion is one of drawing out what often remains unarticulated in the scholarly
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5 Here is an example of how their European counterparts portrayed the Ottomans in 1878: ‘They are
Mahometans on Christian ground. . . . They are exceptional Mahometans in a Christian system. The dif-
ficulties created by their position are great; but for four hundred years they have not been great enough
to prevent the Christians doing practical business with them. . . . As Mahometans they are . . . impracti-
cable members of the European system’ (cited in Deringil, 1998: 136).
6 The persistence of such concerns regarding ambivalence toward Turkey’s difference could be discerned
from the ways in which the European Union’s call for rethinking Turkey’s particular conception and
practices of secularism is portrayed by those at the highest echelons of the state as a threat to Turkey’s
security (see Ergan, 2006; Ergin, 2004).
writings and articulating this in security terms. At one level, there is no need
for translation as such, for these writings are suffused with ‘discourses of
danger’. At another level, however, there is a need for translation, because
the literature discusses threats without explicitly identifying who or what the
referent objects are. Accordingly, the differences between the three accounts
regarding who or what is being safeguarded and against whom or what
remain unarticulated. 
The second section offers an account of the international dimension of the
securityness of secularism through contextualizing the turn to secularism by
Turkey’s founding leaders. Following a brief exposé of the founding leaders’
recourse to ‘discourses of danger’ in making the case for Turkey’s turn to
secularism, I lay out how Turkey’s secularism could also be read as a response
to non-military and non-specific security concerns rooted in the ambivalence
of European/international society toward Turkey’s difference. Locating the
securityness of security (partly but not wholly) in the international realm
would thus help us better understand both the centrality of secularism to
Turkey’s politics and myriad expressions of such centrality through ‘dis-
courses of danger’. A concluding section summarizes the argument and sug-
gests that the present-day centrality of secularism and the securityness of such
centrality could be considered a response to particular remembrances of the
past and interpretations of the present vis-à-vis such ambivalence.
The ‘Domestic’ Dimension 
The literature on Turkey does not explicitly examine the securityness of secu-
larism.7 Whereas secularism’s centrality to Turkey’s domestic politics is dis-
cussed elaborately (Berkes, 1957, 1964; Cizre-Sakallıog lu, 1996; Daver, 1955;
Göle, 1997; Mardin, 1977, 1981; Ozankaya, 1981; Toprak, 1981, 1988), the
question why such centrality is expressed via ‘discourses of danger’? is almost
never asked.8 Where scholars disagree – not in so many words – is regarding
who or what is being safeguarded through secularism and against what or
whom. This section of the article will look at the aforementioned three main
accounts9 that prevail in the literature and tease out the ways in which they
capture different (domestic) security aspects of the centrality of secularism to
Turkey’s politics.
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7 Those rare studies that scrutinize the securityness of secularism do this within the framework of civil–mil-
itary relations and focus on the agency the military exercises through the National Security Council in
shaping the security agenda (see Tank, 2005). 
8 This is not meant as a critique. Critical approaches to security have begun to gain ground in Turkey and
elsewhere only since the mid-1990s.
9 The first two accounts are adopted in modified form from Davison (1998). The third is my characterization
of the Davison and Parla argument (Davison, 1998; Parla & Davison, 2004). 
The ‘Separation’ Account
The ‘separation’ account considers secularism as both a constitutive principle
and an outcome of the project of Republican transformation (see, among
others, Daver, 1955; Kili, 1980, 2003; Lewis, 1961; Ozankaya, 1981; Tachau,
1984; Tanör, 1998; Yavuz, 1990). According to the proponents of this account,
secularism was adopted as part of a project of emancipation by the Republic’s
founding leaders, who sought to separate the affairs of religion from those of
the state, thereby pushing out the political and legal manifestations of Islam.
The political and societal gains that ensued, according to this account,
explain the centrality of secularism to Turkey’s politics. Consider the follow-
ing quote from Suna Kili (2003: 244–245):
In Atatürk’s Turkey, in accordance with the requirements of modernization, religion
and religious institutions were removed from areas, such as education and law, which
did not fall within the proper sphere of their activity. And in their place, laic concepts
and institutions were substituted. Historical experience with the religious groups’ oppo-
sition to modernization had a profound impact on the formulation of the Atatürkist
principle of laicism. 
In Kili’s formulation, religion and religious institutions are portrayed as
blocking the path to modernization; they are criticized for having hindered
the progress of the Ottoman Empire and for disallowing attempts at reviving
such progress, thereby rendering the Empire insecure. Other authors concur:
the Ottoman experience had proven the futility of attempts to transform
without secularization (Ozankaya, 1981; Tachau, 1984; Yavuz, 1990).
Put in security terms, proponents of the ‘separation’ account consider the
threat to be a possible revival of the Ottoman past; what is being protected is
the Republic of Turkey as a project of transformation. The securityness of
secularism, in this account, rests on: (1) secularism’s having allowed the
Republican transformation and the project of emancipation through separat-
ing religiously justified arguments and scientifically justified arguments, and
pushing the former outside the realm of politics and education; (2) its having
helped to secure the Republican transformation against the future assails of
those who might seek to reimpose the Shari’ah upon society and politics,
thereby putting the gains of emancipation at risk. As such, the ‘separation’
account explains both the initiation and the present-day centrality of secular-
ism in Turkey with reference to domestic security concerns.
The ‘Control’ Account
Although authors disagree as regards the reasons for and agents of ‘control’,
their arguments converge in explaining the centrality of secularism with
reference to the role it has played in disciplining the opposition, thereby
keeping in track a particular vision of transformation (Cizre-Sakallıog lu,
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1996; Gülalp, 2005; Keyder, 1987, 2004; Mardin, 1977, 1981; Rustow, 1957;
Toprak, 1981, 1988). According to Binnaz Toprak (1981), secularism in
Turkey served not to separate religion and politics (as in the ‘Western’ model
of church–state separation) but to control religion for the purposes of the
government in office while casting the opposition’s resort to religiously justi-
fied arguments and/or actions in an unfavourable light. This was because,
Toprak (1988: 120) wrote, 
religion in Turkey, especially during the formative years of the Republic, had been the
most important centrifugal force with a potential to challenge the state. It is partly for this
reason that the separation of religion and state was never attempted in its Western version
as Orthodox Islam was put under state control and made subservient to state authority. 
Since the opposition tapped this ‘centrifugal force’ and employed religiously
justified arguments, suggests Toprak, the state resorted to using secularism
to control religion, the ultimate aim being safeguarding the founding leaders’
vision for transformation in Turkey. In variations of this account, Serif
Mardin (1977, 1982) traces the state practice of ‘controlling’ religion back to
Ottoman practices; Çag lar Keyder (1987) synthesizes the insights of Toprak’s
‘control’ and Mardin’s (1973) ‘centre–periphery’ arguments and maintains
that, following the initiation of secularism in the early Republican period,
Turkey’s particular conception and practices of secularism have allowed the
‘centre’ to keep the ‘periphery’ at bay throughout the Republican era.
Expressed in security terms, the ‘control’ account paints a picture in which
those alternative visions of transformation that tapped religion are the threat;
what is being safeguarded is the particular vision of transforming Turkey
conceived by Atatürk and his closest associates. The securityness of secular-
ism, accordingly, rests on the latter’s having allowed: (1) marginalizing those
who favoured alternative visions; (2) underpinning the founding leaders’
vision of transformation by controlling religion as they saw fit. Thus, the
‘control’ account, too, explains the initiation and present-day centrality of
secularism in Turkey with reference to domestic security concerns.
The ‘Material Advancement’ Account 
The third and lesser-known account is offered by Andrew Davison and Taha
Parla, who reject the ‘separation’ and ‘control’ accounts and offer, in their
stead, an account that details and historicizes the self-understandings and
justifications of the founders of the Republic as seeking ‘certain separations
in a context of overall control’ (Davison, 1998: 163; see also Parla & Davison,
2004). Against those who propound the ‘control’ account, Davison and Parla
insist that the founding leaders’ exercise of control involved seeking a degree
of separation. However, they also point out – in contrast to the proponents of
the ‘separation’ account – that this was not the same as the practice of sepa-
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ration of church and state found in some Western contexts.10 The Republican
leaders’ secularism, they argue, was a unique mix of ‘separation’ and ‘con-
trol’ designed to make something else possible: material advancement. There
resides the centrality of secularism in Turkey’s politics according to Davison
and Parla: in the realm of national economic development. It is worth quot-
ing Davison (1998: 172–173) at length: 
In accordance with the RPP’s [Republican People’s Party] reading of the requirements of
contemporary civilization; and to secure the RPP’s hegemony and definition of national
aims in legal, social, educational, cultural and economic matters; and to gain respect for
national sovereignty in the internal and external political circumstances in which the
national movement existed; religion was removed from its previous position of power,
separated in this sense, overdefining the theory and practice of legal, social, cultural, and
economic spheres wherein it was seen as a fetter, causing arbitrary, confused, primitive,
and medieval governance, lethargy, and harmful ills to the people of the Turkish nation. 
A careful hermeneutic analysis of the founding leaders’ discourses led
Davison and Parla to conclude that the Republican leaders considered it
essential to turn to secularism if Turkey were to succeed as a state. The cen-
trality of secularism for Turkey, according to this account, rests in secular-
ism’s having allowed Turkey’s development at a particular historical period
where rapid ‘material advancement’ was crucial for its survival. 
Put in security terms, Davison and Parla identify the threat as the prospect
of failing to ‘achieve success in the material world’ (Davison, 1998: 165; see
also Parla & Davison, 2004: 118–125); what is being safeguarded is the future
of the Republic as an economically successful independent sovereign state. It
is significant to note here that, unlike the previous two accounts, the ‘material
advancement’ account seeks to explain the centrality of secularism at the
moment of its initiation; Davison and Parla do not elaborate on the present-
day centrality of secularism in Turkey – or the securityness of such centrality. 
To recapitulate, what is common to these three accounts – irrespective of
their differences regarding who or what secularism has helped to safeguard,
and against what or whom – is their portrayal of the centrality of secularism
vis-à-vis actual or imminent domestic threats, the implication being that the
centrality of secularism to Turkey’s politics and the apparent securityness of
such centrality is a function of domestic concerns alone. 
The ‘International’ Dimension
This section begins by examining the extent to which the literature on Turkey
considers international dynamics in accounting for the centrality of secular-
ism in Turkey. I will go through the three accounts discussed above to see
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whether/how they incorporate the international, and suggest that they fall
short of accounting fully for the intimate historical relationship between
secularism and security, which has had both domestic and international
dimensions. Next, I will account for the latter by showing how Turkey’s turn
to secularism in part was a response to non-military and non-specific security
concerns rooted in European/international society’s ambivalence towards
Turkey’s difference. 
The ‘International’ in the Literature on Turkey
When they factor in international dynamics – if they do so at all – proponents
of the three accounts discussed above confine the significance of such
dynamics to secularism’s initiation. While the ‘separation’ account refers to
the international in explaining the rationale for the abolishment of the
caliphate, the ‘control’ account mentions it only in passing. The ‘material
advancement’ account goes further than the other two and points to the
founding leaders’ search for international justification for their project of
transformation.
According to the proponents of the ‘separation’ account, not only domestic
but also international dynamics featured in the decision to abolish the
caliphate, a crucial step in the project of Republican transformation.11
Ottoman sultans had acquired the right to use the title of caliph when they
defeated the Mamluk Sultanate in 1517, but did so infrequently, with the
exception of Sultan Abdulhamid II. The caliphate was abolished by the
Republican leaders on 3 March 1924 by an act of parliament. In explaining
this act, scholars who favour the ‘separation’ account maintain that the
caliphate had to be abolished because it had become a burden for Turkey’s
international relations, particularly with those colonial powers that ruled
over Muslim peoples. Kili makes use of Halide Edip Adıvar’s 1930 rendering
of the early days of the Republic to explain such concerns on the part of the
founding leaders. According to Adıvar, who was one of the leading figures of
the nationalist struggle,12 the caliphate was complicating relations with colo-
nial powers of Europe. In her words, these ‘either suspected Turkey con-
stantly of scheming against their sovereignty, or else they themselves were
involved in intrigue in Turkey in order to get control of the caliphate and use
it on behalf of their own ambitions’ (Adıvar cited in Kili, 2003: 356). Kili main-
tains that the abolishment of the caliphate removed not only the grounds for
such interference into Turkey’s affairs but also a cloud of suspicion regarding
the ambitions of the founding leaders by making it clear that these were
confined to the boundaries of Turkey. 
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12 On Adıvar, see Adak (2003).
The proponents of the ‘separation’ account thus point to one important
aspect of the international dimension to Turkey’s turn to secularism – that the
Ottoman legacy (in particular, the legacy of Sultan Abdulhamid II’s use of
Islam for purposes of legitimacy and empowerment in the international
realm)13 carried the potential to complicate the international relations of 
the young Republic. Adıvar’s references to international ‘intrigues’ and the
Republic’s concerns regarding its hard-won ‘sovereignty’ intimate at the
securityness of this crucial step taken towards secularism as seen through the
eyes of the founding leaders.14 That said, the ‘separation’ account’s interest in
the international remains limited to the 1920s and falls short of explaining the
securityness of secularism in present-day Turkey. 
The ‘control’ account leaves even less room for the international. The
centrality of secularism to Turkey’s politics and the securityness of such
centrality are explained with reference to domestic insecurities faced by the
founding leaders and their successors in later years. The ‘material advance-
ment’ account, in turn, is singular in terms of the emphasis it puts on the
international in explaining how the turn to secularism was instrumental in
the founding leaders’ search for international justification for the project of
Republican transformation. Indeed, Davison and Parla consider Turkey’s
turn to secularism in the early Republican era not only as a part of the
broader project of national economic development, but also as an integral
aspect of the overall strategy that made room for such advancement, that is,
through helping pursue a ‘political and rhetorical legitimation strategy’
internationally (Parla & Davison, 2004: 116–125). That said, neither Davison
nor Parla elaborates on these concerns beyond historicizing and contextual-
izing Turkey’s particular conception and practices of secularism (‘certain
separations in a context of overall control’; see Parla & Davison, 2004:
102–104). Nor do the authors consider whether these concerns were limited
to the initiation of secularism in the early Republican era or whether they
could also help explain its centrality in Turkey’s politics in subsequent years
and the securityness of such centrality. The explanatory power of the inter-
national, in the ‘material advancement’ account, is remarkable yet limited.
Accounting for the International Security Concerns of the Founding Leaders
In what follows, I will seek to substantiate my point regarding the intimate
historical relationship between secularism and security by laying out how
Turkey’s turn to secularism could be considered (partly but not wholly) a
response to non-military and non-specific security concerns rooted in Euro-
pean/international society’s ambivalence towards Turkey’s ‘difference’.
Following a brief exposé of the founding leaders’ recourse to ‘discourses of
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danger’ in justifying the turn to secularism, the argument proceeds through
clarifying the key notions upon which it is built, namely, ‘non-military and
non-specific security concerns’, ‘secularism as a security response’, and
‘international society’s ambivalence towards Turkey’s difference’. 
Turkey’s Turn to Secularism in the Discourses of the Founding Leaders
Secularism became a principle of the Turkish constitution in 1937. Notwith-
standing my characterization of this move as a ‘turn’, secularism in Turkey
may be better understood as a ‘process’ that began with the abolishment of
the caliphate in 1924 and continued with powerful steps that included the
abolishment of the Shari’ah and the medrese system (traditional schools where
religion was the basis of instruction) in 1924; Islam being written out of the
constitution in 1928; the adoption of a ‘Western-style’ dress code in 1925; the
introduction of a new civil code (from Switzerland) and the Gregorian calen-
dar in 1926; and the adoption of the Latin alphabet and script in 1928, the
metric system in 1931, last names and the observance of Sunday as a holiday
in 1934, and a new labour law (from Italy) in 1936. In what follows, I will look
at three of these steps and the justifications the founding leaders used to
make a case for taking them. These are the adoption of ‘Western-style’ dress
(specifically ‘the hat’ as headgear), the new civil code, and the abolishment of
the Shari’ah and the medrese system. The ultimate aim of this subsection is to
illustrate the (international) securityness of secularism at the moment of its
initiation as found in the discourses of the founding leaders. 
The so-called hat law was issued on 25 November 1925, banning the use of
the fez, the traditional male headgear. This change was put into practice as
part of the effort to adopt Western-style dress. The move was designed partly
to help unify the society by removing religious symbols as markers of differ-
ence (Kili, 2003: 172). Still, the decision was justified through recourse to ‘dis-
courses of danger’ – not only in terms of the threat of societal fragmentation
(as the rationale above suggests) but also in terms of survival in the interna-
tional realm. At the time, the founding leaders portrayed the fez as a symbol
that marked the Turks’ difference from ‘contemporary civilization’. They
maintained that the adoption of the hat as headgear would help the world
know that the Turk was no longer different but similar to them.15 The urge to
be similar, in turn, was portrayed as a matter of ‘survival’. Consider the
following quotes from an article published in the government-friendly
Cumhuriyet in 1925. The author of the article maintained that the ‘hat law’
gave the following messages to the rest of the world: that the Turk was no
longer different but similar to ‘them’; that the Turk also ‘has the right to live
and be happy’; and that ‘the Turk is a whole new world, with no difference
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nönü’s granddaughter Gülsüm Bilgehan (1994), reports a similar
exchange between her grandparents.
from yours. . . . The Turk is a person like you, wishing to make use of the
fruits of civilization’. The author maintained that adopting the hat as head-
gear was helpful in getting these messages across because ‘it was easier to
show what was outside one’s head compared to what was inside’ (cited in
Mert, 1998: 211; see also Berkes, 1964: 473–474). What is significant about the
above-quoted lines is not that the symbolism of dress style is made use of, but
that the use of such symbolism is justified through invoking security con-
cerns. The adoption of the hat was framed in terms of the survival of the state,
and not as a mere lifestyle choice. 
The second example I will look at to illustrate the securityness of secularism
at its initiation comprises the justifications used in a statement by the then
justice minister Mahmut Esat (Bozkurt) on the occasion of the adoption of the
(Swiss) civil code. It is worth quoting him at length:
Particularly in those states that are made up of citizens belonging to different religions,
it is a must for national sovereignty purposes that the state delinks law and religion –
that is, if it is to enforce a single body of law. Because if laws were to be based on reli-
gion, a state that recognizes the freedom of conscience would then have to make sepa-
rate laws for its citizens of different religious creeds. This, in turn, would go against the
principle of political, societal and national unity that is warranted by contemporary
statehood. It is important to underscore that the state is in interaction with not only its
own citizens but also foreigners. In that case there arises the necessity to agree to the
imposition of capitulations to regulate their behaviour. This was the most significant
aspect of the rationale put forward by our counterparts during the Lausanne Treaty
negotiations to make a case for the continuation of the capitulations (Bozkurt, 1926).
Bozkurt’s words underscored major security concerns: preventing external
interference into the affairs of the state on behalf of non-Muslim citizens,
thereby garnering full sovereignty. Given the ways in which the ‘right to
interfere’ was justified by the members of European/international society on
the basis of the Ottoman Empire’s ‘backwardness’ (by virtue of the role reli-
gion played in Ottoman governance) and utilized as part of intra-European
rivalries during the later years of the Empire, the founding leaders of the
Republic were concerned. One of their concerns was the legal status of non-
Muslim citizens (and the proselytizing activities of various actors), which
had proven to be a major source of insecurity during the later years of the
Empire (see Deringil, 1998: 112–134). However, equally as sensitive as the
legal status of non-Muslims was the need to ensure that European/interna-
tional society recognized that special legal status was no longer needed to
secure the rights and freedoms of non-Muslims. The secular character of the
Republic of Turkey would guarantee the rights and freedoms of non-
Muslims along with the rights and freedoms of the overwhelmingly Muslim
majority of the populace. 
The centrality of secularism to the Republic and the securityness of such
centrality are expressed nowhere more clearly than in the following two
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quotes. The first is from an article by Vasfi Rasit [Sevig], a law professor and
public intellectual with close ties to the founding leaders. The article was
published on 27 August 1927 in Cumhuriyet. It was entitled ‘laiklik’ (secular-
ism), long before secularism had become a constitutional principle but after
the Shari’ah and the medrese system had been abolished. In it, Vasfi Rasit
wrote: 
consider how inadequate are the Anadolu and Rumeli citadels in ensuring the country’s
defence in this day and age . . . similarly inadequate are the existing societal institutions
in saving the country from its current catastrophe (cited in Mert, 1998: 209).
That the author likened the function of secularism in the new Republic to that
of the citadels in the Ottoman Empire – that is, defence – is telling as regards
the securityness of secularism and related reforms in the eyes of the founding
leaders of the Republic.
The second quote from is Ahmet Agaog lu, a journalist and close adviser to
Atatürk during the 1920s:
There are now two roads for us to follow: to accept defeat and annihilation or to accept
the same principles which have created contemporary Western civilization. If we want
to survive, we have to secularize our view of religion, morality, social relations, and law.
This is possible only by accepting openly and unconditionally the mind as well as the
behaviour of the civilization which we are bound to imitate (cited in Berkes, 1964: 465).
Both authors portrayed the turn to secularism as no ordinary move. It was a
security response. 
Having illustrated the ‘discourses of danger’ found in the discourses of
Turkey’s founding leaders, the present article will now turn to clarifying the
key notions upon which its main argument is built (that is, that Turkey’s
secularism was partly a security response to non-specific and non-military
security concerns in the face of European/international society’s ambiva-
lence towards Turkish difference). I will begin with the notion of ‘non-specific
and non-military security concerns’ before discussing how secularism could
be conceived as a response to them.
Non-Military and Non-Specific Security Concerns
One of the main characteristics that distinguish critical approaches to secu-
rity from their mainstream counterparts is the emphasis they put on the non-
military dimensions of security. The focus on non-military security within
critical approaches is not a consequence of the broadening of security agen-
das worldwide, but an effect of – what Booth (1991, 2008, 2005) has termed –
‘deepening security’ to reveal the relationships between myriad referents’
philosophical stance, identities, interests and insecurities. Thus, non-military
security concerns are integral to actors’ reconstitution of their identities and
interests to safeguard against myriad insecurities. 
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The critical security literature points to European integration as a key
historical instance of actors responding to a non-military and non-specific
threat through reconstituting their identities and interests. To quote
McSweeney (1999: 7):
Whatever the personal motives of the individuals who founded it, the EU was a security
policy from its inception. Even with the calculated exclusion of military defence, the
process of integration itself bound the member-states in a network of interdependence
which made the recourse to military means of resolving disputes progressively more
difficult.
The threat European actors were responding to was non-specific and non-
military because, in contrast to NATO’s targeting of possible Soviet expan-
sionism, they had a less visible enemy. They sought to respond to those
insecurities that were feared to follow a possible return to past conflicts struc-
tured around old conceptions of identity and interests (McSweeney, 1999;
Wæver, 1995a, 1998). 
Taking my cue from this rendering of European integration as a response to
security concerns of a non-military and non-specific nature, I offer a reading
of Turkey’s founding leaders’ turn to secularism as a response to non-
military and non-specific security concerns. The threat to the Republic was
non-military in that the gains of Turkey’s national struggle had been sealed
through the Lausanne Treaty in 1923. Yet, while Lausanne had reaffirmed
Turkey’s hard-won sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity, the
founding leaders were nevertheless concerned about the fragility of such
recognition. Accordingly, the threat they sought to respond to was non-
specific in that they were not targeting a specific act of a specific counterpart.
Rather, their policies were designed to respond to what the future might
bring, based on the leaders’ particular remembrances of the past and inter-
pretations of the present. 
Secularism as a Response to Insecurities
In reading secularism as a security response, I follow Michael Williams
(1998), who reminds us that in the history of ‘modern’ Europe, what helped
to mediate difference in both the domestic and the international realms was
pushing religiously justified arguments outside the realm of politics.
Williams’s analysis, in turn, builds upon Stephen Toulmin’s move to locate
modernity’s ‘quest for certainty’ in the insecurities of early 17th-century
Europe. Against those who explain modernity as the ‘outcome of substitut-
ing a rationally self-justifying method for the medieval reliance on tradition
and superstition’, Toulmin maintains that while the ‘rationalists hoped to ele-
vate questions of epistemology, natural philosophy, and metaphysics out of
reach of contextual analysis’, ‘their attempt to decontextualize philosophy
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and natural science had its own social and historical context’ characterized
by insecurities rooted in clashes over/through religious conviction (Toulmin,
1990: 16, 44).
Williams’s own analysis is on the presumed absence of identity in the study
of international relations (IR). Taking issue with prevailing accounts, he
points to how ‘a specific conception of identity is in fact constitutive of, rather
than missing from prevailing theories of International Relations and security’
(Williams, 1998: 205). He reveals IR’s apparent neglect of identity to be a ‘his-
torical legacy of a conscious attempt to exclude identity concerns from the
political realm, or as what might be called a negative identity practice that is a
central element in the liberal sensibility and its construction of the place of
identity in understanding the politics of security’ (Williams, 1998: 205).
What is significant in the accounts of Williams and Toulmin, so far as the
purposes of this article are concerned, is that the intimate historical relation-
ship between seeking to separate ‘claims of faith’ from ‘claims of knowledge’
and searching for security through secularism is not peculiar to the case of
Turkey, but was witnessed in modernity’s ‘quest for certainty’ and in aca-
demic IR’s seeming neglect of identity. The former Toulmin (1990: 70) has
uncovered as being a ‘timely response to a specific historical challenge – the
political, social, and theological chaos embodied in the Thirty Years’ War’;
the latter Williams (1998: 206) has revealed to be an attempt ‘to construct a
material and objective foundation for political practice’. Both cases were
attempts at negotiating difference in the face of a non-military and non-
specific security concern. 
It is in this sense that I seek to offer a reading of Turkey’s turn to secularism
as a security response. Domestically, leaving religiously justified arguments
outside the realm of politics allowed the founding leaders not only to safe-
guard the interests of the ‘core’ elite, but also to construct ‘a material and
objective foundation for political practice’ (to borrow Williams’s formula-
tion) and to make room for Turkey’s national economic development
through empowering positive education. Internationally, pushing a signifi-
cant marker of their difference into the private realm allowed the founding
leaders to give a security response not dissimilar to modernity’s answer to
identity-driven violence. As Williams (1998: 214) notes, ‘just as conflicts with-
in societies were to be avoided by this strategy [of reducing political identity
to abstract individuality], so were those between them’. It is essential to quote
him at length:
Similarly, in the international realm, other polities could in principle be threats – some-
thing more likely if they were not liberal – but they were not necessarily so. Whether
they were or not in this view became an empirical question – an issue of material
military capabilities. The stress on instrumental reason and material capabilities
(strategy, as it has become to be narrowly defined in modern terms) represented a new
political practice. No other sovereignty was in essence or by its very (ontological) nature
606 Security Dialogue vol. 39, no. 6, December 2008
a threat or challenge (consider the difference between this and the logic of religious con-
flict in the Thirty Years War). Whether they were or not was held to be an empirical
question susceptible to the newly defined form of reasoned discourse in a public realm
and capable, in principle, of practical coordination between states (Williams, 1998: 215).
Put differently, secularization of politics and knowledge had allowed pacifi-
cation of international relations in the aftermath of bloody religious wars in
Europe, both domestically and internationally. 
Viewed in this way, Turkey’s founding leaders’ turn to secularism could be
understood as an attempt to emulate the successes of secularism as a security
response as experienced in Europe. Indeed, the proponents of the ‘separation’
and ‘material advancement’ accounts stress how the founding leaders sought
to emulate such success. There is no denying that the gains of secularism in
Europe were a source of inspiration for Turkey’s founding leaders. That said,
there was an added complexity in the case of Turkey. Secularism as a strategy
of pacification helped to govern intra-European relations. European/interna-
tional society, which was constructed during the period analysed by Toulmin
and Williams, had had an ambivalent attitude toward the ‘non-European’. It
is to the founding leaders’ apprehension vis-à-vis such ambivalence and the
insecurities that it entailed that the present article will now turn.
European/International Society’s Ambivalence Toward (Turkey’s) ‘Difference’ 
Beginning from the mid-17th century onwards, as intra-European relations
were pacified, non-European peoples’ difference was increasingly used to
justify their treatment as less than equal and therefore less deserving of
sovereignty and independence. The culture of imperialism, coupled with an
Orientalist mind-set (Said, 1978), provided the grounds for claiming the
‘right’ to ‘better’ rule. Accordingly, throughout the colonial era, peoples
around the world had to fight not only the military forces but also the culture
of imperialism, for it was the culture of imperialism that had allowed various
imperialist practices of military and non-military nature (Said, 1993). 
Such unequal treatment of non-European peoples crystallized in the ‘stan-
dards of civilization’ discourse employed by European/international society.
‘Standards of civilization’ refers to ‘the assumptions, tacit and explicit, used
to distinguish those that belong to a particular society (by definition the
“civilized”)’ (Gong, 1984: 172). In the evolution of European/international
society, ‘standards of civilization’ had come to mean ‘the test of admission for
non-European nations’ (Zhang, 1991: 7). The self-ascribed civilizing mission
of the Europeans aside, ‘standards of civilization’ also proved instrumental
for imperial powers in their interventions into the affairs of non-Europeans
(Mazower, 2006; Suzuki, 2005). Whereas those who were altogether outside
European/international society were considered not deserving of self-
governance (as with India or Africa), others in the process of meeting the
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standards with a view to joining this society had to endure interventions of
one form or another (such as China and Japan). Indeed, even as both of these
latter countries were recognized as having passed the test of ‘standards of
civilization’, they experienced the fickle and fragile nature of such recogni-
tion. While China had to insist that China should not be treated as an excep-
tion to ‘the set of rules declared by the West to be universally binding in
international relations’ (Zhang, 1991: 15), Japanese experience with Euro-
pean/international society ‘was not one of stability and order, but of insecu-
rity’ (Suzuki, 2005: 149). 
The Ottoman Empire had experienced such treatment at first hand when
the British took over Cyprus and sought to legitimize their continued occu-
pation of the island through invoking the superiority of so-called Enlighten-
ment and post-Enlightenment ideas that they introduced to replace what
they portrayed as the ‘useless’ and ‘impractical’ education systems of the
Greeks and the Ottoman Turks (Bryant, 2001). At the time, a similar propa-
ganda campaign was also in effect throughout the Empire through the
agency of Christian schools. After the 1860s, these were widely reported to
have used education ‘as a means of political indoctrination’, thereby making
‘identification with Western civilization seem the antithesis of everything
Ottoman’ (Karpat, 2000: 9).16
From the early 18th century onwards, the Ottoman leadership had identi-
fied such activities as ‘threats’ to its security and sought to address them
through shifting its strategy from ‘security through power’ to ‘security
through order’. The latter meant seeking to become a member of European/
international society by meeting the ‘standards of civilization’. Consider the
following quote from an Ottoman statesman (1879):
The truth of the matter is that unless Turkey . . . does from now on enter seriously and
truthfully into the road of reform and accept the civilization of Europe in its entirety – in
short, proves herself to be a reformed and civilized state – she will never free herself
from the European intervention and tutelage and will lose her prestige, her rights, and
even her independence (cited in Berkes, 1964: 185).
Notwithstanding the many gains of Ottoman attempts at transformation and
the formal recognition extended to the Empire as a member of the Concert of
Europe, Ottoman leaders had to endure the fickle and fragile nature of such
recognition, as with the European refusal to remove the capitulations, which
effectively branded the Empire as ‘less than fully sovereign’. 
Ottoman historian Selim Deringil (1998: 172) laid out the Ottoman conun-
drum in the following way: 
the Ottoman saw himself as an equal participant in the zero-sum games of world
politics, and demanded to be treated as such. The European saw him as an anomaly, a
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16 This experience was not limited to the Ottoman Empire. As Agnew (2006: 185) noted, ‘much nationalism
and imperialism have found purpose and justification in religious differences and in proselytizing’.
master who should really be servant, a ruler who should really be a subject. It was this
dichotomy which produced the Ottoman obsession with image and a determination to
defend it against all slights, insults and slurs. 
Elsewhere, reactions to such portrayals of the ‘non-European’ as not deserv-
ing to rule (by virtue of not being ‘civilized’) and the interlinked ‘European’
claim to ‘better’ rule had taken various forms of resistance. In an unequal set-
ting, where the hierarchical binaries of Western/Eastern or civilized/uncivi-
lized were defined by the ‘powerful’, the ‘weak’ had invariably sought to
resist by feigning ‘similarity’ – that is, being and/or becoming ‘modern’,
‘civilized’, ‘Western’ (Bhabha, 1994; Ling, 2002). 
It was as a part of the struggle to be recognized as an equal, and therefore as
deserving of the right to ‘rule’, that Ottoman statesmen engaged in exercises
in image-building, which was essentially a ‘symbolic statement of [the
Empire’s] right to exist in a world which was constantly trying to relegate it
to history’ (Deringil, 1998: 165).17 During Sultan Abdulhamid II’s reign, for
instance, ‘attendance at the [world] fairs acquired a new importance’, but the
aim was to present the Empire ‘as the leader of the Islamic world yet a
modern member of the civilized community of nations’ (Deringil, 1998: 154).
The point being that, while feigning similarity, the Ottomans nevertheless
retained the strongest of the symbols that rendered them ‘backward’ in the
eyes of their European counterparts: the centrality of religion to the Empire’s
domestic politics and the Shari’ah as a system of governing its Muslim sub-
jects. The founding leaders of the Republic of Turkey took one more step and
turned to secularism.
Conclusion: Negotiating Difference Through Secularism
This article began with a question: where are we to locate the securityness of
secularism in Turkey? After considering the existing answers in the literature
(that is, in the domestic realm), I suggested that the current overemphasis on
the domestic has produced an incomplete picture, for it overlooks the inter-
national. Looking at the international, in turn, allows better understanding of
the intimate historical relationship between secularism and security in
Turkey. Contextualizing – domestically and internationally – the founding
leaders’ turn to secularism revealed it to be (in part) an effect of the insecuri-
ties that followed international society’s ambivalence towards Turkey’s dif-
ference. Indeed, focusing purely on the domestic dimension has not only
Pinar Bilgin The Securityness of Secularism 609
17 Needless to say, providing a reading of Ottoman/Turkish transformation as ‘mimicry’ is not to reduce it
to mere emulation. Nor does it foreclose capturing alternative modernities. Rather, it allows understand-
ing transformation as part of a broader security response designed to remove the grounds for external
interference so as to make room for sovereign development.
rendered incomplete our understanding of the securityness of secularism at
the moment of its initiation, but has also had consequences for our under-
standing of the intimate relationship between secularism and security in
present-day Turkey. What is more, the existing accounts’ under-emphasis of
the international has allowed others to overemphasize the domestic dimen-
sion in explaining the present-day securityness of secularism (see Bilgin,
2008). While the proponents of these accounts cannot be held responsible for
others’ appropriation of their ideas, it is nevertheless significant to note that
their under-emphasis of the international has had consequences for our
understanding of elite recourse to ‘discourses of danger’ when safeguarding
Turkey’s particular conception and practices of secularism against internal
and external challengers. 
Consider, for instance, M. Hakan Yavuz (2003: 46), who, building upon the
main tenets of the ‘control’ account, has asserted that throughout Turkey’s
history the state has considered ‘large sections of its own society, rather than
foreign countries, as its main threat’.18 Yavuz has here done away with the
‘control’ account’s nuanced treatment of the early days of the Republic and
the security concerns of the founding leaders, thereby reducing the security-
ness of secularism to the centre–periphery struggle, which, in fact, unravelled
somewhat later. What is significant for my purposes here is that Yavuz’s
apparent abandon of the international, while seemingly helpful in explaining
elite recourse to ‘discourses of danger’ against the challenges of the (reac-
tionary) opposition, nevertheless leaves unexplained why the same elites
have employed similar notions of threat in responding to Christian prosely-
tizing in Turkey19 or the European Union’s calls for the betterment of the
religious rights and freedoms of minorities.20
That said, not all are convinced regarding the persistence of such security
concerns (stemming from international society’s ambivalent treatment vis-à-
vis Turkey’s ‘difference’) in present-day Turkey or the room for such con-
cerns in contemporary world politics. Ahmet Davutog lu (2000), for instance,
while recognizing the founding leaders’ concerns with the fragility of
Western recognition and the potential consequences of withholding such
recognition, has nevertheless downplayed the basis for such concerns.
Without wanting to underplay the author’s point that the grounds for the
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18 Yavuz’s (2003) original phrase is the ‘securitization of Islam’. However, his choice of words seems mistak-
en considering the gist of the argument he makes regarding the state establishment’s targeting of ‘Islam’
as a threat to secularism. Accordingly, his is a critique of the securitization of secularism, not Islam.
19 The reforms passed in line with EU conditionality are represented as having allowed the rise of Christian
proselytizing in Turkey; see Aksam (2005). Given the National Security Council’s previous categorization
of Christian proselytizing as a threat to national security, the use of such rhetoric has the potential effect
of branding Turkey’s accession to the EU as endangering its security (see Bilgin, 2005).
20 The minorities in Turkey are non-Muslims, as defined in the Lausanne Treaty of 1923. In recent years, EU
calls for the betterment of the religious rights and freedoms of both non-Muslims and the Alevi (see
European Union, 2006) were portrayed at the highest levels as an attempt to create ‘artificial minorities’,
thereby preparing the groundwork for dismembering Turkey; see Radikal (2007).
hierarchical binaries of civilized/uncivilized and oriental/occidental should
be subjected to critical scrutiny, it is of the essence to underscore the need to
analyze such actions as the Republican leaders’ turn to secularism by locating
them within their proper historical and international political contexts. That
secularization as a theory is currently questioned within academia (Berger,
2001) does not make the founding leaders’ concerns regarding their differ-
ence less ‘real’. Nor does it render the centrality of secularism in present-day
Turkey and the securityness of such centrality less ‘real’.
Indeed, the insecurities of particular societies are unique – as are their
responses to such insecurities. Those who wish to challenge the prevailing
conception and practices of secularism in Turkey would have to begin from
the beginning: to historically contextualize the centrality of secularism to
Turkey’s politics and the securityness of such centrality. My attempt at pre-
senting such an analysis revealed multiple insecurities that were addressed
by the founding leaders’ turn to secularism. Given the persistence of the
European Union’s ambivalence regarding Turkey’s difference (Hurd, 2006),
coupled with Turkey’s actors’ particular remembrances of the past and inter-
pretations of the present vis-à-vis such ambivalence, understanding the
historical securityness of secularism in Turkey is a must if we are to be able to
better comprehend present dynamics and foresee the future.
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